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Abstract
This paper describes our DKU replay detection system for
the ASVspoof 2019 challenge. The goal is to develop spoof-
ing countermeasure for automatic speaker recognition in phys-
ical access scenario. We leverage the countermeasure system
pipeline from four aspects, including the data augmentation,
feature representation, classification, and fusion. First, we in-
troduce an utterance-level deep learning framework for anti-
spoofing. It receives the variable-length feature sequence and
outputs the utterance-level scores directly. Based on the frame-
work, we try out various kinds of input feature representations
extracted from either the magnitude spectrum or phase spec-
trum. Besides, we also perform the data augmentation strategy
by applying the speed perturbation on the raw waveform. Our
best single system employs a residual neural network trained
by the speed-perturbed group delay gram. It achieves EER of
1.04% on the development set, as well as EER of 1.08% on the
evaluation set. Finally, using the simple average score from sev-
eral single systems can further improve the performance. EER
of 0.24% on the development set and 0.66% on the evaluation
set is obtained for our primary system.
Index Terms: anti-spoofing, replay detection, deep learning,
data augmentation, speed perturbation
1. Introduction
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) refers to automatically
accept or reject a claimed identity by analyzing speech utter-
ances, and nowadays it is widely used in real-world biometric
authentication applications [1–3]. Recently, a growing number
of studies have confirmed the severe vulnerability of state-of-
the-art ASV systems under a diverse range of intentional fraud-
ulent attacks on various databases [4–6]. The initiative of the
series ASVspoof challenge aims to promote the development
of spoofing countermeasure studies [7]. The task in previous
ASVspoof 2015 challenge was to discriminate genuine human
speech from speech produced using text-to-speech and voice
conversion attacks [8]. The ASVspoof 2017 challenge is to as-
sess audio replay spoof attack detection “in the wild”, and the
spoofing recordings are created from real uncontrolled replay
setup [9–11].
The ASVspoof 2019 challenge extends the previous chal-
lenge in several directions [12]. In this paper, we only focus on
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the replay detection sub-task in the physical access scenario. A
controlled setup in the form of replay attacks simulated using
a range of real replay devices and carefully controlled acoustic
conditions are adopted. The goal is to develop countermeasure
systems that can distinguish between bona fide and the spoofed
speech by replay.
Recently, the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) classifier
trained with constant Q cepstral coefficient (CQCC) feature has
been the benchmark for various anti-spoofing tasks [13,14]. The
CQCC feature is a perceptually-inspired time-frequency analy-
sis extracted from a constant-Q transform (CQT) [15, 16]. The
GMM is an unsupervised generative model and is widely used
to depict the probability distribution of audio features. It as-
sumes that all frames of features are independent and identically
distributed, and features are grouped to estimate the parameters
of GMM in the training stage. Given the GMM classifier, the
final utterance-level scores are derived by averaging the frame-
level log-likelihood altogether.
Although the CQCC-GMM official baseline is an effective
spoofing countermeasure, there remains much potential to im-
prove. Previous work in [17–19] have investigated the effi-
ciency of deep learning approach compared to the GMM classi-
fier. Various kinds of feature representation other than CQCC,
such as short-time Fourier transform (STFT) gram [18], group
delay gram (GD gram) [19] are also explored and show supe-
rior performance. Besides, Cai et al. have also demonstrated
that suitable data augmentation (DA) can also significantly im-
prove the replay detection system performance [20].
Taking the DKU system for ASVspoof 2019 challenge as
the pivot, we aim to explore the countermeasure system in
physical access scenario from the following four aspects, in-
cluding the data augmentation, feature representation, classifi-
cation, and fusion. First, we introduce an utterance-level deep
learning framework for anti-spoofing. Considering the variable-
length nature of speech, the deep neural network (DNN) re-
ceives a feature sequence of arbitration duration and outputs the
utterance-level posteriors directly. Based on the framework, we
try out various kinds of input feature representations from ei-
ther magnitude spectrum or phase spectrum. They include the
CQCC, linear frequency cepstral coefficients (LFCC), inverted
Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (IMFCC), STFT gram, and
GD gram. Besides, we also perform a simple yet effective DA
strategy by applying the speed perturbation on the raw wave-
form to increase the quantity of training data.
2. Methods
2.1. Utterance-level DNN framework
All of our systems are built upon a unified utterance-level DNN
framework. We first use the approach for the task of speaker and
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Figure 1: Utterance-level DNN framework for anti-spoofing. It accepts input data sequence with variable length, and produces an
utterance-level result directly from the output of the DNN.
language recognition in previous works [21–23]. As demon-
strated in Fig. 1, the DNN framework accepts variable-length
feature sequence and produces an utterance-level result from
the output unit directly.
The network structure here is somewhat similar to that one
in [19]. However, there exist two main differences: (i) the
input feature sequence is first either truncated or padded to a
fixed length along the time axis, and then further resized to a
512×256 “image” before feeding into the DNN in [19]. In con-
trast, we employ a variable-length training strategy, and in the
testing stage, the raw full-length feature sequences are fed into
our DNN directly. (ii) the training procedure in [19] contains
the complicated two-stage flow. Both of the two-stage networks
rely on a pre-trained model from the large-scale Imagenet [24]
dataset. In contrast, we train a single DNN from scratch only
using the ASVspoof 2019 training set.
We first transform the raw waveform into a frame-level fea-
ture sequence based on hand-crafted filters. The output se-
quence of feature extraction is a matrix of sizeD×L, whereD
is the feature dimension along the frequency axis, andL denotes
the frame length along the time axis.
As depicted in Fig. 1, we use a deep convolutional neural
network (CNN) to further transform the raw feature into a high-
level abstract representation. For a given feature sequence of
sizeD×L, typically, the CNN learned descriptions are a three-
dimensional tensor block of shapeC×H×W , whereC denotes
the number of channels,H andW denotes the height and width
of the feature maps. Generally, H and W are much smaller
than the original D and L, since we have many downsample
operations within the CNN structure.
The CNN acts as a local pattern extractor, and the learned
representation by CNN is still with temporal order. The remain-
ing question is: how to aggregate the whole sequence together
over time? Concerning about that, we adopt a global average
pooling (GAP) layer on the top of CNN [25]. Given CNN
learned feature maps F ∈ RC×H×W , the GAP layer accumu-
lates mean statistics along with the time–frequency axis, and the
corresponding output is defined as:
vi =
1
H ×W ×
j=H∑
j=1
k=W∑
k=1
F i,j,k (1)
Therefore, we get fixed-dimensional utterance-level repre-
sentation V = [v1, v2, · · · , vC ] from the output of GAP.
We further process the utterance-level representation
through a fully-connected feed-forward network and build an
output layer on top. The two units in the output layer are repre-
sented as bona fide and spoof categories. We can optimize the
whole countermeasure system in an end-to-end manner with a
cross-entropy loss. The final utterance-level score can be di-
rectly fetched from the DNN output.
2.2. Feature representation
In this section, we investigate different input feature represen-
tations upon the introduced DNN framework in Section 2.1.
2.2.1. CQCC
The CQCC feature is obtained by perceptually-aware CQT cou-
pled with traditional cepstral analysis. It is reported to be sensi-
tive to the general form of spoofing attack, and yields superior
performance among various kinds of features [16]. More details
of CQCC can be found in [14].
2.2.2. LFCC
The official baseline systems adopt the CQCC feature as well
as the LFCC feature.
LFCC is a kind of cepstral features based on triangle filter-
bank similar to the widely-used Mel-frequency cepstral coeffi-
cients (MFCC). It is extracted the same way as MFCC, but the
filters are in the same triangular shape rather than on mel scale.
Therefore, LFCC might have better resolution in the higher fre-
quency region [26].
2.2.3. IMFCC
IMCC is also a kind of filter bank based cepstral features. The
difference with MFCC is that IMFCC uses filters that are lin-
early placed in “inverted-mel” scale, which lays more stress on
the high-frequency region [26].
2.2.4. STFT gram
Let x(n) be a given speech sequence and Xn(ω) its STFT after
applying a window w(n) on the speech signal x(n). X(ω) can
be expressed as
Xn(ω) = |Xn(ω)|ejθn(ω). (2)
where |Xn(ω)| corresponds to the short-time magnitude spec-
trum and θn(ω) corresponds to the phase spectrum.
The square of the magnitude spectrum is called the STFT
power spectrum. We adopt the logarithm of the power spectrum
as the STFT gram.
2.2.5. Group delay gram
Most spectral features are derived from the STFT magnitude
spectrum, while the short-time phase spectrum is not used, con-
sidering that the fact that the human ear is phase “deaf”. How-
ever, the phase spectrum has been used for various speech pro-
cessing tasks including synthetic speech detection and audio re-
play detection recently [19, 27–29]. Paliwal et al. have shown
that deviations in the phase that are not linear are important for
perception [30], and deviations in phase can be represented us-
ing the group delay function.
τ(ω) = −d(θ(ω))
dω
(3)
where the phase spectrum θ(ω) of a signal is defined as a con-
tinuous function of ω. The group delay function can also be
computed from the signal as in [28] using
τx(ω) = −=
[
d(log(X(ω)))
dω
]
=
X<(ω)Y<(ω) + Y=(ω)X=(ω)
|X(ω)|2
(4)
where < and = refer to the real and imaginary parts of the
Fourier transform. X(ω) and Y (ω) are the Fourier transforms
of x(n) and nx(n), respectively.
2.2.6. Joint gram
Regarding that the speech signal is completely characterized
by both the short-time magnitude and phase spectrum, here we
combine that STFT gram and GD gram together to form a new
feature representation. Typically, we can consider the input fea-
ture sequence as a 1 × D × T “image”, where 1 denotes the
image channel, D denotes the image height, T denotes the im-
age width. Thus the joint gram is formed as a two-channel “im-
age”. For example, given separated STFT gram and JD gram
of size 512 × T from the same utterance, a joint gram of size
2× 512× T is formed as the DNN input.
2.3. Data augmentation
DA, which is a common strategy adopted to increase the quan-
tity of training data, has been shown to be effective for neural
network training to make robust predictions. Many methods
such as the x-vector system rely on external datasets/resource
to perform data augmentation. However, external speech data is
strictly forbidden for the ASVspoof 2019 challenge. Consider-
ing that, we adopt the DA strategy by applying a simple speed
perturbation. Specifically, we apply standard 3-way speed per-
turbation using factors of 0.9, 1.0 and 1.1 [31]. After that, we
have training data of 3 times the original for both bona fide and
spoof category.
2.4. Model selection and fusion
Ideally, we can use the development dataset to select the best
DNN checkpoint and then train the ensemble parameter on the
development set for fusion. However, the evaluation plan indi-
cates that we should submit both development and evaluation
set scores. If we do so, the performance on the development set
will be overfitting and lead to a rather low error rate.
Regarding this fact, we treat the development set the same
as the evaluation set. This means that we only use the training
set for both DNN training and system fusion. Since we have
no separated validation set, the converged model after the last
Table 1: Detailed network structure and number of parame-
ters for each module. It downsamples at the last three blocks
(Res2, Res3, and Res4) using stride=2 for their first convolu-
tional layer. The total number of parameters is about 1.33M.
Layer Input size Output size Structure #Params
Conv1 1×512×L 16×512×L 3×3, stride 1 144
Res1 16×512×L 16×512×L
[
3×3, 16
3×3, 16
]
×3 4K × 3
Res2 16×512×L 32×256× L
2
[
3×3, 32
3×3, 32
]
×4 18K × 4
Res3 32×256× L
2
64×128× L
4
[
3×3, 64
3×3, 64
]
×6 72K × 6
Res4 64×128× L
4
128×64× L
8
[
3×3, 128
3×3, 128
]
×3 288K × 3
GAP 128×64× L
8
128 Pooling 0
FC 128 32 Fully-connected 4K
Output 32 2 Fully-connected 66
optimization step is selected for evaluation. As for the system
fusion, we only adopt a simple score-level average operation to
get the final ensemble score.
3. Experiments
3.1. Data protocol and evaluation metrics
We strictly respect the official protocols defined in the eval-
uation plan and submit both development and evaluation set
scores. We have 54 000 training utterances altogether, including
5400 bona fide audio and 48 600 spoofed audio from various re-
play conditions.
The primary metric is the minimum normalized tandem de-
cision cost function (min-tDCF) defined by the organizer [32].
An alternative equal error rate (EER) is adopted as a secondary
metric.
3.2. Feature extraction
The LFCC feature, CQCC feature, as well as the GMM clas-
sifier, is exactly followed the official baseline provided by the
organizer.
For IMFCC feature, 20-dimensional static coefficients are
augmented with their delta and double delta coefficients, mak-
ing 60-dimensional IMFCC feature vectors.
For STFT gram and GD gram, the FFT bins are set to 1024.
The frame length is 25 ms, with a frameshift 10 ms. Finally, we
get 512 feature vector for each frame.
3.3. Network setup
To get higher-level abstract representation, we design a
deep CNN based on the well-known residual neural net-
work (ResNet) [33]. We adopt the ResNet-34 backbone, but
our network is slightly “thin” that the output channels of the
front-end ResNet are only up to 128, which leads to a small
number of total parameters. The core modules and the corre-
sponding parameters are described in Table 1. We use batch
normalization followed by the ReLU activation functions after
every convolutional layer. The convolutional layer is all with
kernels of 3× 3.
We adopt the common stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
algorithm with momentum 0.9 and weight decay 1e-4. The
learning rate is set to 0.1, 0.01, 0.001 and is switched when
the training loss plateaus. In the training stage, the model is
Table 2: Comparison of different classifiers on the development
set
Feature Classifier EER(%) min-tDCF
CQCC GMM 9.87 0.1953
CQCC ResNet 4.77 0.1127
LFCC GMM 11.96 0.2554
LFCC ResNet 2.62 0.0609
Table 3: Comparison of different types of feature on the devel-
opment set
Feature EER(%) min-tDCF
CQCC 4.77 0.1127
LFCC 2.62 0.0609
IMFCC 3.66 0.0890
STFT gram 4.11 0.1070
GD gram 1.81 0.0467
trained with a mini-batch size of 128. We design a data loader
to generate the variable-length training examples on the fly. For
each training step, an integer L within [150,350] interval is ran-
domly generated, and each data in the mini-batch is truncated
or extended to L frames. Therefore, a dynamic mini-batch of
data with the shape of 128 ×D × L is generated prior to each
training step, where D is the input feature dimension, and L is
a batch-wise variable number indicating the frame length.
We choose the output from the bona fide unit as our final
score. In the testing stage, the full-length feature sequence is
directly fed into the network, without any truncate or padding
operation. Due to the fact that utterances may have arbitrary
durations, we feed the testing audio to the trained network one
by one.
3.4. Results on back-end classification
To compare the back-end classifier, we fix the front-end fea-
ture representation as CQCC/LFCC in this section. From Ta-
ble 2, we can see that no matter for CQCC or LFCC feature, the
ResNet classifier based on our introduced utterance-level DNN
framework is significantly superior to the baseline GMM clas-
sifier. Therefore, we fix the back-end classifier as the ResNet
model for the following experiments.
3.5. Results on front-end feature representation
In this section, we fix the ResNet back-end classifiers and per-
form experiments on different types front-end feature represen-
tations. From Table 3, we can see that the performance of the
countermeasure system strongly depends on the choice of the
feature representation. The GD gram based on the phase spec-
trum yields the best among the investigated five features.
3.6. Results on data augmentation
The results in Table 4 show the effectiveness of the DA based
on speed perturbation strategy. 18% relative EER reduction is
achieved on the development set for the STFT gram system, and
48% for the GD gram system.
Table 4: Effect of the DA strategy on the development set
Feature DA EER(%) min-tDCF
STFT gram 7 4.11 0.1070
STFT gram 3 3.35 0.0904
GD gram 7 1.81 0.0467
GD gram 3 1.03 0.0265
Table 5: Overall performance on both the development set and
the evaluation set. EER are written before the slash, min-tDCF
are behind. N/R: Not Reported.
ID System DA Dev Eval
1 CQCC–GMM 7 9.87/0.1953 11.04/0.2454
2 LFCC–GMM 7 11.96/0.2554 13.54/0.3017
3 LFCC–ResNet 7 2.62/0.0609 N/R
4 IMFCC–ResNet 7 3.66/0.0890 N/R
5 STFT gram–ResNet 3 3.35/0.0904 N/R
6 GD gram–ResNet 7 1.81/0.0467 1.79/0.0439
7 GD gram–ResNet 3 1.03/0.0265 1.08/0.0282
8 Joint gram–ResNet 3 1.14/0.0209 1.23/0.0305
Fusion 3+4+5+6+7+8 0.24/0.0064 0.66/0.0168
3.7. Results on fusion and generalization
Table 5 shows the system performance on both the development
and the evaluation set. Since only four systems can be submitted
at most, some system performance on the evaluation set could
not be reported at this stage. Our best GD gram–ResNet sys-
tem achieves relative 90% EER reduction as well as min-tDCF
on both development set and evaluation set. Finally, using the
simple average score from several single systems can further
improve the performance. EER of 0.24% on the development
set and 0.66% on the evaluation set is obtained for our primary
system. This reveals the complementariness of the system out-
puts from classifiers trained with different features.
The performance on the development set and evaluation set
are very close, reveals the robustness of our proposed system.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we take the DKU system for ASVspoof 2019 chal-
lenge as the pivot and explore the design of the countermeasure
system against replay attack through data augmentation, fea-
ture representation, classification, and fusion. First, we utilize
a ResNet back-end classifier based on the introduced utterance-
level deep learning framework. Second, we investigate vari-
ous kinds of front-end feature representations and find that the
GD gram based on the phase spectrum is pretty effective for
replay detection. Moreover, a simple data augmentation based
on speed perturbation can also significantly improve the perfor-
mance, especially for the GD gram–ResNet system. Finally,
both the single and primary fusion systems dramatically de-
crease the EER and min-tDCF on not only on the development
set but also on the evaluation set.
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